Очко в европу

A point in Europe

In the archives of the Moscow Arbitration Court, dozens of court rulings are stored, and a careful reading of them allows one to recall how, at the end of 2012, the city authorities decided to bring happiness to Muscovites and visitors to the city with thousands of public toilets. Beautiful, convenient, clean, so that in Moscow, restrooms would be no worse, and even better, than in the most well-equipped cities in Europe. But, alas, they wanted the best, and it turned out as always. They failed to break through the toilet window to Europe. This is more like a point in Europe or a banal scheme to siphon budget billions into the pockets of crafty businessmen. At the end of 2012, the Department of Housing Commissions, Utilities, and Landscaping of the city of Moscow announced a tender for a ten-year lease of land plots for the placement of 1200 public toilets. All plots were divided into two lots. During the auction held in January 2013, the companies Komhozservice and Estekonsalting were recognized as the winners, with whom contracts for the provision of sanitary and hygienic services to the population were concluded.

These firms undertook the obligation to contribute about 2 million rubles monthly to the city treasury for 10 years. For the lease of approximately six hundred land plots each. About 2 thousand rubles per month for each plot. Komkhozservis and Estekonsalting turned out to be firms connected with businessman Sergey Glyadelkin, the same one who worked for many years in the team of Elena Baturina, the wife of Yuri Luzhkov, who served as the mayor of Moscow for 18 years. Glyadelkin became famous in Kazakhstan and gained fame throughout Moscow in 2010 when, apparently, he realized that the Luzhkov era was coming to an end and that he needed to quickly distance himself from both the disgraced mayor and his wife. Upon realizing this, he wrote a complaint to the FSB, stating that Luzhkov's deputy, vice-mayor, and head of Moskontrol, Alexander Ryabinin, was extorting a bribe from him, Glyadelkin, in the form of a non-residential premises and 2 million dollars in cash. Glyadelkin.

Glyadelkin was recognized as a victim and key witness and placed under round-the-clock state protection, which was carried out by the FSB's own security department. In 2019, the fame of Sergey Glyadelkin spread throughout Russia. That year, he once again became a victim and witness in a criminal case initiated against FSB officers, and he very much helped divert public attention from the stockpiles of money—12 billion in ruble equivalent—discovered during a search of apartments linked to one of the defendants in the case at the time of the arrest of the FSB lieutenant colonel and head of the banking department of the KFSB administration, Kirill Cherkalin. So, this famous serial victim, Sergey Glyadelkin, apparently turned out to be involved in the European kickback as well. Because Igor Tkach, a former high-ranking Moscow official, fellow countryman, childhood friend, and relative of Sergey Glyadelkin, was the sole founder of one of the firms that won the competition for renting land plots for toilet modules.

And the sole founder of the second company, which ventured into the toilet business, turned out to be Gledelkin's fellow countryman and childhood friend, Vladimir Simonenkov. A brief digression. I want to explain why I became interested in Moscow's toilets in the first place. The fact is that two years ago, on July 24, 2022, we released the program "Donbas Zigzag." You can watch the program via the link under this video. There, you can also subscribe to the channel for the ship's journal team. This is important. But for now, let me remind you of some facts that were mentioned two years ago. In 2014-2016, the Moscow company "Trust MSM-1" received 18 billion 400 million rubles from the Ministry of Construction of Russia for the restoration of socially significant facilities in Donbas. The money was allocated under contracts as part of providing humanitarian aid to the population of foreign states. According to the terms of the government order, these 18 billion 400 million rubles were intended for the restoration of 436 facilities in the social sphere and infrastructure in the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic.

At that time, it was still self-proclaimed, but not yet recognized by anyone. Not even Russia. But the billions that were deposited into the account of the company "Trust MSM-1" were opened on time. The Federal Treasury Department for Moscow was swiftly diverted to the accounts of other companies. For example, 13 billion 600 million rubles flew away from the treasury's control to the accounts of the company "Construction Company Flagman." The money also didn't linger in the accounts of "Flagman" and were also transferred to the accounts of other firms, which had all the signs of being shell companies, which are typically used for the withdrawal, cashing out, and embezzlement of budgetary funds. In 2014-2015, when "Flagman" was integrated into the circular flow of money allocated for the reconstruction of Donbass, the sole founder of this company was Vladimir Simonenkov. The materials of the criminal case initiated against FSB officers contain a protocol of Simonenkov's interrogation, conducted on June 26, 2019, at the Main Directorate for the Investigation of Particularly Important Cases of the Investigative Committee.

Simonenkov told the investigator that he "was born and raised in the city of Smela in the Cherkasy region of Ukraine and has been friends with Sergey Glyadelkin since childhood, as they lived next door." In 1996, after completing his mandatory military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Simonenkov went to Moscow, where Glyadelkin invited him to work as his assistant. Soon after, Simonenkov also made a business career in Moscow, becoming the founder and director of several firms for his friend. Although during the interrogation at the Investigative Committee of Russia, Simonenkov openly admitted that he agreed to Glyadelkin's proposal to be listed as the nominal owner and director of several enterprises, he did not take any initiative. He acted solely on Glyadelkin's instructions. Simonenkov explained that he selflessly agreed to this role because he really wanted to help his childhood friend. He was flattered that Glyadelkin trusted him. So, in 2014-2015, Vladimir Simonenkov was not only the founder and director of the company "Flagman," which was essentially a money laundering operation, but also a 100% founder of the firm "Kamhossservice," the name of which, as I mentioned, appeared in the court records of the Moscow Arbitration Court in cases related to the toilet business.

It should be noted that the toilet business of the companies registered to Sergei Gledelkin's compatriots and friends was very brisk. They installed booths in crowded places. The service turned out to be in demand. The return of money. The money earned. The return of money should have been enough to cover the rent for the land plots and toilet modules, as well as overhead costs. There should have been profit left over. But in November 2014, both "Kamhossservice" and "ST-Consulting" simultaneously stopped transferring money for land rent. The city turned to the arbitration court. And managed to obtain a decision to terminate the contracts and recover the debts. But the city never received this money. Because while the court proceedings were ongoing, "Kamhossservice" and "ST-Consulting" changed their founders. Instead of Gledelkin's compatriots Igor Tkachev and Vladimir Simonenkov, two offshore companies from the Seychelles became the sole founders of the company. And this happened almost simultaneously in September 2015.

Subsequently, the companies were liquidated. By the way, both Seychelles firms were registered at the same address in one room. A spicy detail. But the processes, which stretched over several years, saw both "Kamkhozservis" and "ST-Consulting" almost synchronously file counterclaims for lost profits. They brought a whole heap of documents to court, proving that the toilet business was, and apparently still is, a very profitable business. The counterclaims indicated that some of the allocated plots turned out to be unsuitable for installing toilet modules. Let's try to figure it out. In the figures recorded in court documents. In the arbitration court decision of Moscow dated September 12, 2014, the exact number of toilet modules for which "ST-Consulting" received the right to install was named—609. In the decision dated February 1, 2017, it was black and white recorded that "ST-Consulting" filed a counterclaim for damages in the form of lost profits amounting to the initial sum of 17 million rubles.

This was in 2016. And shortly after, another amount. 86 million 329 thousand 320 rubles. The first amount—17 million. This is supposedly lost profit from 7 toilet modules, which could not be installed because the land plots turned out to be unsuitable for providing sanitary and hygienic services to the population. The second amount—86 million rubles. This is supposedly lost profit from 7 toilet modules. Lost profits were also incurred from another 28 addresses, where toilets could not be installed either. So, out of 609 toilet modules, ST-Consulting could not install 35. But it turns out that the remaining 574 were installed, and they operated around the clock and brought stable income? Now let's turn to the figures calculated and presented in court by ST-Consulting itself. The company calculated the lost profit for a period of 24 months, based on the fact that each functioning toilet module brought in 102,773 rubles in revenue per month, which is 1,224,000 rubles per year.

We multiply this number by 574 active toilet modules and find that the annual revenue from the operation of the toilets amounted to more than 700 million rubles. I repeat, these figures were presented by the company ST-Consulting itself. However, in its annual financial reports for previous periods, ST-Consulting indicated a very modest revenue of 6,420,000 rubles in 2013 and 14,597,000 rubles in 2014. It turns out that the company, whose founder at that time was Igor Tkachev, wanted to deceive the court by inflating its revenue in a claim for lost profits. Similar calculations were provided in a counterclaim by the company Komhozservice. But by the time the arbitration courts were still slowly processing the claims for contract termination and the unsuccessful collection of debts for land rent, the city had concluded a new contract for providing the same sanitary and hygienic services to the population.

By the way, the city did not bankrupt the debtors or disqualify the managers, as required by law. But this time, there was no rent for the land lease. The city also did not demand payment for the right to place advertising banners on the walls of the toilets. On the contrary, the city committed to annually pay hundreds of millions of rubles for the operation of those very toilet modules, already installed throughout Moscow under a contract concluded back in 2013. At the same time, it showed no interest in the fate of the money collected from Muscovites and city guests, which also went to the new mysterious company. The already profitable business became even more lucrative because the money flowed in from three sources: the city budget, through the state budget institution of the city of Moscow Dorinvest, from advertisers for the banners, and directly from those who urgently needed to use a public toilet. And the company that was fortunate enough to fall under this powerful cash flow turned out to be the limited liability company ORK.

Also related to the aforementioned Sergey Glyadelkin. The sole founder and general director of this company, with a charter capital of 10 thousand rubles, was Sergey Nikolaevich Frolov. In 1997, Frolov was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for theft. However, after serving his sentence, he completely reformed and started a new life by working as Glyadelkin's personal driver. In 2017-2019, Dorinvest transferred 697 million 336 thousand 915 rubles to the company ORK. In 2020-2021, 517 million 19 thousand 574 rubles. In 2022-2023, 512 million 963 thousand 700 rubles. On December 31, 2023, Dorinvest and ORK signed a new two-year contract for 584 million 992 thousand 620 rubles. It is written on the Moscow toilet cabins that they are serviced by LLC ORK. Here is the sign, the phone number, everything as it should be. The accounts of the company ORK also receive the money that clients pay through terminals.

By the way, the payment terminals do not issue any receipts. An interesting point. It seems that ORK does not bother with cleaning the toilets and providing the so-called sanitary and hygienic services. ORK has delegated this mission to Dorinvest. That very state budget company from which it received hundreds of millions of rubles annually. And, judging by the bank transactions and accounting reports, ORK returned about 25% of the budget money to Dorinvest for the cleaning and maintenance of these very toilet modules. Almost all the remaining funds ORK regularly transferred to the company Santex for the rental of the toilet modules. The sole founder of the company to which the toilets were registered during those years was the already mentioned Vladimir Simonenkov, a fellow countryman and childhood friend of Sergey Glyadelkin. A few years later, Santex changed its founder. Instead of Vladimir Simonenkov, the general director and sole founder of the company became British citizen Jay Carpenter, who had never been to Russia and was possibly not even aware that he owned and managed a firm that owned hundreds of Moscow toilets.

At the same time, instead of the expired contract with Santex, ORK had others. Instead of Santex, there were others. Fresh contractors. And soon the company, whose founder and director was listed as a Briton, stopped submitting financial reports and was then completely liquidated by the Federal Tax Service as a shell company for failing to submit reports. And for some reason, it never occurred to anyone in the city administration that the city could purchase toilets worth a million to one and a half million rubles itself, and with a large order even 20 percent cheaper. And already recoup the purchase costs within a year. Perhaps the management of Dorinvest was too distracted by its other function—catching stray dogs. However, maybe the idea of purchasing toilet modules was indeed considered in the city administration. The Moscow government has both a municipal economy complex, an economic policy complex, a social development complex, and a trade and services department, with thousands of specialists with higher economic education.

But perhaps, in mathematics, as in a popular Soviet sketch, only dad was strong. Although no. It is possible that Ork and personally Sergey Glyadelkin have acquired a very influential either lobbyist, or patron, or partner, whom no one in the army of Moscow officials dared to contradict. While examining the documents of the Ork company, we discovered that among the 48 people employed by this toilet company in 2020 was Lydia Olegovna Morina, née Pyakhtistova, the daughter of the influential FSB general Oleg Pyakhtistov. In the program "General Fyaktistov's Mistake," we have already talked about the possible connection between the general and Sergey Glyadelkin. For example, that Denis Morin, husband of Lidia Olegovna and son-in-law of General Oleg Fyaktistov, became a shareholder of the holding company Avenue Group Limited in August 2016, which he registered in Hong Kong together with Sergey Glyadelkin and Igor Tkachev.

Subsequently, numerous assets of the Austrian Avenue Holding and its subsidiaries began to be transferred at a bargain price to this Hong Kong company. The Austrian company, on the other hand, stopped submitting balance sheets in 2020 and, according to the Austrian company registry, entered technical bankruptcy and then liquidation proceedings. And the Austrian Avenue Holding, which was once a huge holding company that Gledelkin himself valued at nearly a billion dollars, disappeared without paying taxes on profits earned from budget statuses, constructions, and contracts, neither in Austria nor in Russia. Dozens of the holding's companies in Russia, which he decided to liquidate, he simply abandoned. And the tax inspectorate kindly, without asking unnecessary questions about taxes, simply removed them from the unified register of legal entities. Why check? Who knows what you might find? For ordinary entrepreneurs, such antics often end very sadly. You can watch the program "General Feoktistov's Mistake" at the link below this video. And now let's return to the point in Europe. It may be a coincidence, but the company "Org," associated with Gledalkin, received multi-million toilet contracts precisely after the general's son-in-law, Oleg Feoktistov, became a co-founder of the company "Avenue." I have strong suspicions that it was indeed retired FSB General Oleg Feoktistov who helped Sergei Glyadelkin and his friends and fellow countrymen find themselves under the billion-dollar toilet cash flows from the budget of the city of Moscow. Money doesn't stink, as the Roman Emperor Vespasian once said a long time ago. Let's delve deeper into this.