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How Ukraine squeezed ROSATOM out of the interests of the American company Westinghouse Electric
The cooling of Russian-Ukrainian relations began long before the start of the special military operation. In the field of nuclear energy, the first cat ran back in 2008, when the American company Westinghouse Electric began to supply its fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power plants.
And the "ice age" came in 2014, when the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine suspended cooperation with the Russian "Rosatom" on the construction of the third and fourth power units of the Khmelnitsky NPP.
On September 16, 2015, the then head of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko signed a law on the termination of all contacts between Russia and Ukraine in the field of nuclear energy.
Russia and Ukraine signed an intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the third and fourth power units of Khmelnitsky NPP on April 30, 2010.
Ukraine did not have the money for such a large-scale project. The money was allocated by Russia. In the form of credits. Initially, it was two billion dollars.Rosatom's cooperation with Ukraine was not limited to the Khmelnitsky project. Modernization of two power units at the Rivne NPP and three at the Yuzhnoukrainsk NPP was discussed. And the construction of a new large nuclear power plant in the East of the country.
For the implementation of all these projects, Russia was ready to allocate about twenty billion dollars in the form of long-term loans.
Due to its geographical location, Ukraine had a chance to become the largest exporter of electricity to Europe. Pay off loans for the construction and launch of nuclear power plants, and start receiving decent incomes from European consumers.
But the liner of mutually beneficial economic prospects at full speed crashed into the rocks of political intrigue and Ukrainian corruption. Rosatom was squeezed out of the Ukrainian market, making room for the Americans. Even despite the fact that only for the units for the Khmelnitsky NPP, Ukrainians will be forced to overpay the Americans several billion dollars.
Rosatom offered a comprehensive contract, and it has already accumulated experience in putting facilities into operation more or less on schedule, unlike Westinghouse, which has practically no construction projects in the United States or China, stretching for at least a decade.
In September 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky flew to the United States, where he was received by then-US President Joe Biden.
After this meeting, the signing of an atomic agreement between the United States and Ukraine, worth about $ 30 billion, was announced.
Two months later, on November 22, 2021, in Kiev, the American company Westinghouse Electric signedЭнергоатомомan agreement on cooperation in the nuclear field with the Ukrainian Energoatom.
Two contracts were signed. The first one is for the purchase of design services for two power units of the Khmelnitsky NPP. The second is for the purchase of necessary equipment by Ukraine.
Information to think about.
У Westinghouse Electric has a very dramatic history overall.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, they blatantly deceived the outstanding inventor Nikola Tesla, without paying him for the patents purchased from him.
They cheated the tsarist government of Russia, for which in the First World War they undertook to produce rifles that had never been made before, but they broke the contract. To establish the production of rifles of good quality and could not.
Due to strategic mistakes, Westinghouse Electric's huge business with hundreds of electrical engineering and other industries has shrunk to the production of equipment for nuclear power plants and the American nuclear fleet.
In 2017, its owner, by that time it was a Japanese Toshiba, declared the company bankrupt and received protection from creditors. The reason for bankruptcy is the lack of contracts.
It was in this post-bankruptcy comatose state that the American company Westinghouse Electric was at the time of signing agreements withthe Ukrainian Energoatom.
In 2023, the company was sold to the Canadian mining company Cameco and an investmentfund. At a bargain price equal to only a fraction of her debts. The entire company and all its debts were purchased for 7 billion , despite the fact that there were almost ten billion dollars in debts.
Moreover, just at this time, top managers of Westinghouse Electric were interrogated by the FBI and the Prosecutor's Office of the state of South Carolina, where fraud, corruption and forgery were being investigated during the construction of two units of the VC Summer nuclear power plant in the south-east of the United States.
Компания Westinghouse cheerfully undertook to build these power units back in 2012. But I never built it. The customer did not pull the constantly growing project budget.
But all this did not stop Ukraine. And instead of at least buying the rights to technologies together with a couple of power units and partially localizing production,the Ukrainian Energoatomsigned a multibillion-dollar overpayment contract with a sinking American company.
Despite the fact that Rosatom assumed the obligation to take spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing and disposal to Russia, and in the case of the American contract, the spent fuel will remain in Ukraine.
It is obvious that there was no economic feasibility in this Ukrainian-American contract. It was a Big policy in its purest form. And corruption! Because Ukrainian businessmen, it seems, had big plans for the construction itself, because Westinghouse does not have any construction facilities and specializes, I repeat, in the production of equipment, and the rest is outsourced.
Apparently, it was the politicians who dictated such decisions. The situation was similar with the exclusion of Rosatom from the tender for the construction of a new power unitof the DukovanyNPP in the Czech Republic.
This happened back in 2021. When Westinghouse Electric declared a real war on ROSTAM, displacing not only the construction and modernization of power units, but also the supply of fuel for TVEL nuclear reactors from the market.
Ten years before the start of the Special Military Operation, the markets of Bulgaria, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Poland were lost. So the special operation has absolutely nothing to do with it. The undeclared war against ROSATOM began long before the outbreak of hostilities.
The decision of the German Economy Ministry, which refused to agreeon Rosatom's purchase of a 25 percent stake in one of the local nuclear fuel plants in 2022, also looks politically motivated.
In the same year, a deal with Sweden broke down, which abandoned plans to buy a new type of Russian fuel for its nuclear power plant.
At the same time, in 2022, Finland terminated the contract with Rostatom for the construction of a nuclear power plant at Cape Hanhikivi— on the shore of the Gulf of Bothnia.
To date, Rosatom has only one project left in Europe – the construction of two power units of the Paks-2 NPP. This is the same project that Russian President Vladimir Putin said after meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 last yearОрбаном:
"...Russia and Hungary continue to cooperate in a number of areas, primarily in the energy sector. And the key principles are healthy pragmatism and mutual benefit. Work continues on the flagship joint expansion projectof the Paks nuclear power plant. The commissioning of the fifth and sixth units will increase the capacity of this station by more than half. This will improve the energy supply of the Hungarian economy, as well as the supply of low-cost and clean energy to industrial enterprises and households."
Optimistic, of course, which is really there. Vladimir Putin is always optimistic. But personally, I recently had concerns that during the implementation of this project, Ростатомуsticks may well start being inserted into the chariot of Rostatom from where these very sticks seem to be not worth waiting for.
The fact is that this project, how should I put it mildly... stuck, no, not good, not stuck, let's just say... leaned Sergey Glyadelkin.
This is a character whose life and deeds I've been studying for years. I admit that he already looks like an old acquaintance of mine, who came down from the pages of 12 chairs by Ilf and Petrov. Something like the locksmith Polesov.
When I read something about Sergei Glyadelkin, I immediately remember the intelligent locksmith Viktor Mikhailovich Polesov.
The secret of Cherkalin's billions
I repeat, I don't know why, but голову настойчивоfor some reason this passage from "12 chairs" persistently comes to mind when I think of Sergei Glyadelkin. The same one who, in tandem with his cousin Igor Tkach, masterfully acted as a victim in the famous criminal case against the former head of the banking department of the FSB's K department, former Lieutenant Colonel Kirill Cherkalin. The same security officer, in whose apartments several cubic meters of dollars, euros, rubles were found – about 12 billion rubles in ruble equivalent.
The mystery of the origin of the Cherkalinsky billions was never seriously investigated. And this happened largely thanks to Glyadelkin and the Weaver. Because Cherkalin was able to plead guilty to committing another invented crime, which no one committed.
This is my firm value judgment!
In general, despite the fact that Cherkalin signed a cooperation agreement, pledgedto provide information about the origin of billions, and help solve crimes of embezzlement of funds from commercial banks, the Prosecutor General's Office and the investigation received a big cookie, not information.
And Glyadelkin and Tkach are now trying to recover some other mythical billions in other courts, referring specifically to the verdict against Cherkalin, which was issued in a special order without the court examining any evidence. At the same time, without submitting a single document that someone owes them at least a penny.
Meanwhile, Cherkalin has been released for almost a year. He was released before serving even half of the seven years in a high-security penal colony set by the court.
At first, he was transferred to correctional labor, and according to the documents, he worked as a security guard in the Nizhny Novgorod restaurants Chaykhona and Weeping Willow. And then completely unserved 2 years, 2 months and 3 days Dzerzhinsk court was replaced by a fine of 500 thousand rubles.
For more information, see the program "Lieutenant Colonel Cherkalin on face control in chaykhon".
I must say that Glyadelkin and Tkach also did not lose out.
Despite the fact that the criminal case has been archived for a year and a half, but the state registers of real estate, legal entities, all sorts of records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc. – all this is still hidden under the proud name of the Russian Federation, which, either out of someone's stupidity, or interest, still provides Glyadelkin, Tkach and even their relatives - the son and wife of a former major Moscow official Tkach - are provided with services to classify their data in all types of registers and all credentials.
Of course, the FSB can shrug that this young investigator simply forgot to removestate protection. But we'll just smile at it. How can one only smile skeptically at the fact that after the release of the program "Life on Ksiva under the protection of the FSB", no one wants to seriously check the strange circumstances of obtaining Russian citizenship by Glyadelkin and Tkach? As well as numerous fictitious addresses and fake documents used to obtain their Russian citizenship.
Details of these very muddy stories about how Ukrainian citizens Glyadelkin and Tkach, who came to Moscow from the Ukrainian city of Smela in the late 90sСмела, became Russian citizens can be found in the programs "Life on Ksiva under the protection of the FSB?" and "Secrets of Captain Tkach".
Billions for Donbass
However, citizenship is probably a small thing. Compared to the $ 19 billion that was allocated for the restoration of the Donbass to firms controlled by Glyadelkin and Tkach, but it seems that they did not reach the Donbass. Donbass got a big cookie. And Glyadelkin and his patrons, apparently, have become richer by 19 billion rubles. Unfortunately, no one from the law enforcement agencies wants to deal with this story for some reason, although they told about it in the summer of 2022. In the program "Donbass zigzag".
IGH Institute and Paks-2 NPP
But back to where we started. To the nuclear power industry. Specifically, to the history of the construction of two power units of the Paks-2 NPP in Hungary. And the role of Sergey Glyadelkin in this project.
Croatia. Zagreb. This city is home to the IGH Institute, which was once a fairly decent Croatian design company. The company's history dates back to 1949.
Over the decades, the IGH Institute has been involved in the design of dozens of facilities.
But since 2013, the institute was in a preliminary bankruptcy procedure and only after eleven years, in the summer of 2024, it was able to get out of it.
According to the balance sheet for the first 9 months of 2024, IGH Institute's personnel costs exceed its core business revenue. Having accumulated losses of the previous years by as much as 18 million euros, the institute makes ends meet only at the expense of a mysterious "other" operating income. In 2014, Sergey Glyadelkin somehow managed to become a key beneficiary of this institute. How he did it is a different story. In early January 2019, the Croatian press wrote: Literally:
"...one of the largest projects in tourism, the development of Kupari, one of the elite Croatian tourist destinations, is being carried out by the Avenue Group company with Russian owners. The same investor —the owner of Avenue Group Sergey Glyadelkin-bought the construction companies Institute IGH andHydroelektra in Croatia. He has been living in Zagreb for more than ten years and soon after his arrival received citizenship."
The largest tourist project in Kupari - a five - star hotel in Dubrovnik-has not yet been implemented by Glyadelkin.
The company "Hydroelektra" was driven into bankruptcy.
The IGH Institute, when Glyadelkin's people found themselves in its leadership, also began to regularly get into scandals.
Take, for example, the Georgian branch of the Institute, registered already in the Glyadelkin period of the history of "IGH", in September 2016.
Since its establishment, IGH-Georgia has won five competitive tenders from the Department of Roads of Georgia. Because of these tenders, a corruption scandal broke out in Georgia.
It was widely reported in the Georgian press that Paata Abutidze, Deputy Chairman of the Georgian Roads Department, played a key role in concluding these contractsПаата Абутидзе. Who, before taking up this position, worked as the Managing Director of IGH-Georgia. And the most fat contracts were awarded to the branch of the Glyadelkin Institute quite by chance, being the only participant in the competition. Georgians did not fan the scandal, but both the head of the Georgian Roads Department and the Minister of Regional Infrastructure Development lost their posts.
But back to Croatia. To the participation of the IGH Institute in the construction of power units of the Hungarian Paks-2 NPP. It should be noted that IGH had zero experience in the nuclear industry. In addition, the company has never operated in Hungary itself.
Under a contract with Rosatom's subsidiary, компанией «Atomstroyproekt, which is building Hungary's Paks-2 nuclear power plant, the Glyadelka Croatian Institute has opened a representative office in Hungary to meet the formal requirements. And he pledged to carry out construction supervision of the design and all construction for three years, including not only the quality of work, but also the quality of all materials and equipment.
That's what's so alarming. As if the Glyadelkin Institute did not put a pig on ROSATOM. The fact is that in Croatia, Glyadelkin has a reputation as a patriot not of Russia, but of Ukraine.
In March 2022, the popular Croatian weekly "National", which specializes in investigative journalism, published a large article about Sergey Glyadelkin.
In an interviewwith National» , Glyadelkin said that he is a Russian entrepreneur originally from Ukraine, and that he was deeply shocked by Russia's special operation in Ukraine. And that the IGH Institute has closed all its Moscow offices. Literally:
"IGH is currently preparing a fundraising campaign for Ukraine.... Like other influential businessmen who have worked with Russia for years, he hopes that he will not fall under sanctions. Although he worked for many years and made good money in Moscow."
End of quote.
And this very company, which in March 2022 publicly announced preparations for fundraising for Ukraine, somehow managed to" lean "againstthe Rosatomproject for the construction of the Hungarian Paks-2 nuclear power plant.
Even more worrisome is the fact that to date, the head office of the IGH Institute in Zagreb has halved its headcount. According to the Croatian press, the institute is still going through hard times. According to its public statements, IGH does not have a sufficient number of serious and profitable contracts concluded.
Maybe this is another grandiose plan of Sergey Glyadelkin and Igor Tkach?
The fact is that the IGH Institute has interesting assets in the form of land plots with very good investment potential for commercial or residential development.
Maybe the largest shareholders of the enterprise Tkach and Glyadelkin decided to somehow вымутитьextort its land from the enterprise?
The question is rather rhetorical. I don't have an answer. As there is no answer to the question of how ROSATOM, which seems to be a very serious organization, managed to contact Sergey Glyadelkin?
What did Glyadelkin leave in Moscow
The fact is that in the public archives of decisions of Moscow courts, a lot of court decisions have been preserved, which include dozens of organizations that were very expensive to cooperate with companies controlled by Sergey Glyadelkin and Igor Tkach.
Because of chronic non-fulfillment of obligations, banal throws, substitution of materials, litigation, and other things. Glyadelkin and his associates created more and more new companies, making them out to be figureheads, brothers-in-law, childhood friends, mainly from Ukraine. And they threw more and more trusting customers and subcontractors.
There were a lot of outstanding and terminated contracts. Here are just a few examples.
Contract with Ingeok for the construction of the foundation slab of government buildings in Moscow City on site number 15, where the Moscow government office was to be built.
Ingeokom terminated the contract. Because the volume and quality obligations were not fulfilled.
Along the way, the Moskva River was also polluted. Yes, so powerfully polluted that the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources counted then 6 billion rubles of losses of the city.
Connections with the security forces saved us from bankruptcy.
The agency was advised to forget about the fine.
Or the construction of the famous Moscow house Dirigible on the Trade Union.
The Pricast company, a subsidiary of the MSM1 Glyadelkinsky Trust, which was later renamed Mosstroy, undertook to build the facility.
But the house was already completed by the Tashir group company.
Glyadelkin's firm poured concrete up to the 20th floor. And on the twentieth floor, it turned out that half of the floors used a cheaper brand of cement.
Construction of the house was stopped for more than a year. A showdown with investors and creditors has begun.
It took many months to examine the entire building. Design reinforcement of structures.
Everyone knew perfectly well that Igor Tkach, who at that time was the head of Mosnadzor, and to whom the functions of ordering and controlling contract work on the construction of this house were transferred, would not expose his cousin Glyadelkin outside the door as a negligent subcontractor. It won't replace it with another, more competent performer. As a result, the project was sold to Tashir with large losses. This probably wouldn't have happened if more competent specialists had been involved in the construction. And not being able to perform work efficiently and on time, it is difficult to engage in the construction business.
Glyadelkin's partners and cooperation with VTB structures on the Gorki 8 project did not work out. It was a huge project. But the case also ended with the termination of the contract and the court, which the MSM 1 Trust lost.
The Glyadelkinsky MSM1 Trust was also kicked out of the construction site of building 10 on Levoberezhny Prospekt.
The trust has built 30% of the residential building by municipal order. But Glyadelkin was not fartanul. Construction control was carried out not by Mosnadzor, which was headed by Igor Tkach, but by the structures of Mosfundamentstroy-6. They didn't turn a blind eye to deadlines and abysmally poor quality.
The contract for the construction of building 16 on the same Levoberezhny Prospekt 1,2, concluded by the Glyadelkinsky trust with the Mayor's office under Luzhkov, was canceled at the initiative of residents of neighboring houses with the support of United Russia.
The construction prices of the Glyadelkinsky contractor were already twice as high as the average prices of the municipal order of that time.
By the way, the Russian company "ETO-S" with similar functionality as the Croatian Institute IGH, which performed construction control at most construction sites of the Glyadelkacontractors, was bankrupt with multimillion-dollar debts.
What a finale, the apotheosis of Glyadelkin thebuilder!
Construction of the Severny Park residential complex on Leningradka street. It lasted for more than ten years.
This project has become a disgraceful long-term construction of the Moscow construction complex.
During this construction, real estate investors even blocked traffic on the streets, desperate to get the truth in the courts and reach out with their claims to the Moscow government, which turned a blind eye to Glyadelkin's art. Because Tkach had been covering for him since his time as deputy of Moscow's ubiquitous Control Committee.
A sad end now awaits Glyadelkin's main enterprise in Russia, his Mosstroy, the former MSM1 Trust, through which almost 19 billion rubles were transited in the direction of the Donbass.
In 2024, the Federal Tax Service began to bankrupt this company for long-term tax debts amounting to more than 230 million rubles.
At the same time, it turned out that the company does not have any property.
On February 11, 2025, the Arbitration Court decided to reject the tax claim for bankruptcy of MSM-1. And do you know why? Because there are no funds for an arbitration manager.
In general, only a few months remain before this company is excluded from the register of legal entities.
In general, wherever you throw it, there is a wedge everywhere. The shadow of an intellectual locksmith is everywhere Viktor Mikhailovich Polesov from "12 chairs", which for some reason I remember all the time.
That is why I am very worried about the contract of the IGH Institute, which is controlled by Sergey Glyadelkin, concluded withthe Rostatom subsidiary компанией Atomstroyproekt to participate in the construction of power units of the Hungarian Paks-2 NPP
We have no choice but to continue to monitor developments. And pray to the Almighty that Glyadelkin didn't put a pig under Rosatom's latest project in Europe. So that Russia does not get a big Cookie.
